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Abstract: NASA's Johnson Space Center (JSC) has utilized COTS products in its
programs since the early 1990's. Recently it has become evident that, of all failure
modes possible, radiation will probably dominate; sometimes to the point of driving
system architecture. It is now imperative that radiation susceptibility be addressed when
writing the system requirements. Susceptibility assessment, e.g. testing, must begin early
in the design phase to establish performance and continue through the hardware
qualification program to prove satisfaction of the original requirements(s). Examples of
requirements, testing, and architecture versus failure rate will be given.
1.0 Introduction. The options for
developing flight hardware in today's
engineering environment have changed
dramatically from the Apollo and Shuttle
eras. In the past, the then modern
technology parts were available with
pedigrees for their performance in the
ionizing radiation found in orbit. If a
particular part in a design did not have
the proper pedigree, often there was a
part that could be substituted by
"similarity". If the similarity option was
not available, it was generally practical
to find a new part and perform the low
energy heavy ion test necessary to
establish the susceptibility of the part. In
the case of low earth orbit (LEO) for
which the manned space program is
concerned and on which this paper is
centered, most parts were capable of
meeting the mission requirements.
Those few parts that had unacceptable
performance like destructive latch ups
were uncovered in the part qualification
test regimen.	 The budgets and
development	 schedules
	 of these
programs were compatible with the "part
level" assessment technique of that day.
Today, budgets are smaller and
development schedules shorter. This
combination just cannot support the test
regimen of examining each individual
part by itself in the radiation
environment before incorporating it into
the design. This is further complicated
by the fact that some functions needed
on orbit are best satisfied by commercial
products; at the part, the board or even
the system/box level! Examples of these
are GPS receivers, 1553 bus units, DC-
DC converters, and even laptop
computers. It should be recognized that
generally every active electronic part in
these products is COTS and has no
radiation susceptibility pedigree or
similarity to a part that does have a
pedigree. The project is then faced with
the dilemma of how to qualify a system
design for the ionizing radiation
environment.
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An approach to attacking this dilemma is
coming into focus at NASA/JSC. It
concentrates on three main areas.
The first area is agreement with the
customer that designing and developing
the product as "rad hard" is not feasible
or affordable except in extreme cases
(for example extreme criticality coupled
with minimal options for redundancy) or
very simple cases. The hurdle here is to
come to grips with the fact that there will
be a non-zero probability of having an
error of some type during the mission.
The second area is centered on deriving
requirements that reflect what is felt to
really be necessary for the mission to be
a success. This can be an interesting
exercise in coming to grips with reality.
It also can be educational in revealing
how politics can influence reality.
The third and last area is to insist that
performance be verified by test at the
part, board and/or box level. The testing
is essential to being successful in today's
COTS world. The exact test
methodology, or better yet minimum test
criteria, plays an important role for this
part of the approach and is driven by the
mission orbit/trajectory and time
duration. For manned LEO missions,
high energy proton testing fits nicely.
This paper will explore these three areas
in more detail.
2.0 On Accepting Less than "Rad Hard".
For many years the accepted and
generally unchallenged requirement for
flight at JSC was that every part must
pass ionizing radiation tests to an LET
(linear	 energy	 transfer)	 of 36
1mg/cm2.	 Over the years it
.e accepted by the community that
if such a test was passed for every part,
the system was "rad hard". Of course
such is not true. For example assuming
that no latch ups were seen to an LET of
36 does not mean that the threshold for a
latch up doesn't exist at 36.1
MeV//mg/cm2. And, in fact if one did
exist, then the mean time between failure
(MTBF) for such a failure would be on
the order of 50 years, assuming a
saturated cross section of le-2 cm2.
And the probability of successfully
completing a 10 day Shuttle mission
would be approximately 0.999 as
calculated by the constant failure rate
distribution function of
Ps = exponential (-T/MTBF)
Where:
Ps is the probability of completing the
mission without failure,
T is the mission time, and
MTBF is 50-years based on an LET of
36 and cross section of le-2.
Unfortunately the success probability
decreases for the long-term mission like
the International Space Station (ISS).
With the ISS mission time being 10
years instead of 10 days, the probability
of success for the ISS mission drops
from 0.999 to approximately 0.82.
Acceptance of less than "rad hard"
performance requires that the remaining
risk be quantified. Once quantified, this
risk can be played into the equation with
all other identified risks and a composite
probability of success estimated. If this
fits in to the overall mission success
probability, the radiation assessment
criteria meets the project/program needs.
This is a much more definitive
requirement than the original "test to an
LET of 36" criteria.
2
For the vast majority of hardware flown
at JSC, acceptable performance for flight
is proven with acceptable performance
while in an high energy proton beam
(MTBF equal to or greater than 10 years
for errors not seen).
3.0 On Realizing Smart Requirements.
The crux of successfully utilizing COTS
on orbit centers on customer buy-in to
the non-radiation hardened product.
This buy-in, in actuality, is legally
documented in the project/program
requirements. It is important that any
and all battles be waged and decisively
concluded before leaving the
requirements stage. If not, the cost of
just the ionizing radiation portion of the
non-recurring engineering can increase
by a factor of 20 to 100. And this
doesn't count the effects of lengthening
the development schedule or of any
redesign impacts.
The Shuttle Cockpit Avionics Upgrades
(CAU) is a project currently in
development at JSC. It is one of the
newest examples of deriving and
imposing different requirements to
accommodate COTS products in a major
program.
3.1 New Radiation Requirements for the
Space Shuttle. The National Space
Transportation System (NSTS) has the
Shuttle or Orbiter as one of the three
elements. The other two major elements
are the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB's)
and the External Tank (ET). The Orbiter
portion of the NSTS is under control of
JSC and recently received the "go
ahead" to develop upgrades for certain
avionic functions in the cockpit. Since
JSC has been flying COTS products and
relying on them heavily since the mid
1990's, the radiation susceptibility and
radiation compatibility questions were
well known and a process in place to
qualify hardware for flight. It became a
matter then of incorporating the proper
requirements into the CAU program.
However, these requirements must be
compatible with the overall NSTS
standard, NSTS 07700.
The Orbiter Vehicle End Item (OVEI)
Specification, MJ070-0001-1 D, is a flow
down from NSTS 07700 for the Orbiter
vehicle alone. As regards ionizing
radiation the OVEI had had the
following requirement in force for years:
"3.5.20 Avionics Radiation
Requirements. Orbiter avionics designed
after February 8, 1993, shall meet the
performance and operability
requirements while operating within the
natural radiation environment, as
specified in paragraph 10.1.7.5. All
radiation effects, such as, Single Event
Upset (SEU), Latchup, and burnout shall
be considered. "
With the advent of flying COTS parts
and products this requirement was
proven to be deficient; specifically in the
general terminology of "meet the
performance and operability
requirements while operating in the
natural radiation environment". Many
interpretations were being used and
generally they were an interpretation for
convenience and/or profit. For instance,
some contractors insisted in one breath
that this meant all parts had to be tested
to an LET of 36 (which is expensive),
but in the second breath used weak if not
non-existent similarity analyses to
qualify a part as being acceptable in the
radiation environment. The end results
were that NASA either was spending too
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much money and schedule doing heavy
ion testing at the part level or NASA,
because of inadequate similarity
analysis, was sure not of the
susceptibility of the products being
flown.
After long discussions and heated
debate, paragraph 3.5.20 of the OVEI
specification was amended to be:
3.5.20 Avionics Radiation Requirements.
Orbiter avionics designed after
February 8, 1993, shall meet the
performance and operability
requirements while operating within the
natural radiation environment, as
specified in paragraph 10.1.7.5. All
radiation effects, such as, Single Event
Upset (SEU), Latchup, and burnout shall
be considered.
For Orbiter avionics designs initiated
after January 1, 2000, proof of the
ability to meet the performance and
operability requirements in the radiation
environment shall be established by
failure rate estimations at the box or
system level. The failure rate
estimations shall be based on actual test
data although the use of part similarity
data shall be allowed as indicated in
subsequent paragraphs.
3.5.21 Radiation Testing and Test Data.
Radiation testing may be done at the
part, board, sub-assembly, and/or
system level. Proper test data obtained
from other tests may be used where
appropriate. The minimum radiation
test level required to establish
performance and operability levels shall
be by exposure of the test article to
either
200 MeV (+/- 10 Mei) protons to a
fluence of IEI0protons/cm2, or
heavy ions producing Linear Energy
Transfers (LET'S) of from I
MeV//mg/cm2 to 14 MeV//mg/cm2 in
appropriate steps of LET to a fluence of
1 E6 ions/cm2.
In the former case, the Bendel A data
reduction technique is sufficient for
estimating the proton cross section
curve. In the latter case, the cross
section curves must be established from
threshold to an LET of 14 Me V//mg/cm2.
Radiation induced failure modes not
seen during this testing can be expected
to have Mean Time Between Failure
(MTBF) intervals of ten years or
greater.
3.5.20.2 Use of part Similarity Data in
Estimating Radiation Susceptibility. The
use of similarity shall be defined on a
system by system basis. The allowed
usage of similarity shall be documented
in the system certification plan. When
similarity is used to establish the
radiation susceptibility of an EEE part
by comparison to a `similar' EEE part
that has known radiation characteristics,
all elements of the following criteria
shall be satisfied:
1. Both EEE parts must be the product of
the same approved QPL, QML and/or
ISO 9000 manufacturer.
2. Both parts must have been
manufactured on the same line.
3. The processing of both parts must
have been identical, especially the
critical parameters of rate of oxide
growth, temperature of the oxide process
and final oxide thickness.
4. The two parts must be similar in
function and identical in technology
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including the same mask design,
identical feature size, deposition and
doping.
5. The same foundry, off shore or on
shore, must have produced both wafers.
Allowable technologies for Radiation
Similarity consideration are DMOS,
CMOS, VMOS, diffused junction, and
alloy junction. "
Rationale: Minimum test levels and
_failure rate estimation requirements are
based on independent NASAIJSC
research, test, and analysis. "
This new requirement does several
things:
It establishes that the proof of the ability
to meet the performance and operability
requirements shall be established at the
box or system level. The proof shall be
in the form of an estimate of the failure
rate (i.e. 1 /MTBF).
It requires that this proof be based on
test data.
It defines the minimum level of testing
that is acceptable. Note that more
testing can be done and indeed will be
necessary in some cases to prove that the
performance	 and	 operability
requirements have been met.
It establishes the criteria for establishing
"similarity" between a part with no
radiation pedigree and a part with
radiation pedigree. This is not an easy
test to pass but it is the criteria
recommended by experts in the field.
3.2 Radiation Requirements for the
Shuttle Cockpit Avionics Up rg, ades. The
new Orbiter radiation requirements were
in place when the CAU program began
and resulted in some new and interesting
requirements being generated for this
upgrade effort. The new is in the sense
that the requirements quantitatively
addressed the desired probability of
success. The interesting is in what
actually drove one of the requirements —
politics.
Here are the pertinent CAU
requirements for performance in the
ionizing radiation environment:
Requirement 1: MTBF for Non-
destructive Radiation-Induced Events
Requiring User Intervention
A single-string of the CDPS hardware
shall have a functional interrupt MTBF
of 1000 days or greater when evaluated
via the methodology of Section 3.5.20 of
the OVEI specification.
Rationale: A single string MTBF of
1000 days or greater will support a
single functional interrupt every 10
missions for that string. This assumes
that the missions are 10 days in
duration. Single event effects that are
corrected through other means; such as,
Error Detection and Correction (EDAQ
logic, do not factor into this MTBF
calculation. The 1000 day MTBF only
applies to uncorrectable errors
requiring user intervention. It will be
left to the vendor to determine the
method in which the hardware will be
recovered.
This requirement provides a probability
of success of 0.9995 for the worse case
dynamic flight of 12 hours for a single
string of the CDPS. When it is assumed
that there are three operational strings
of CDPS hardware, the probability of
losing all three strings in the 12 hour
period becomes very small [theoretically
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(5x10-4)31. The worse case dynamic
flight duration of 12 hours is based on
an abort scenario that requires several
orbits prior to landing. The 12 hour
duration encompasses the time from
liftoff to landing.
Erroneous output due to radiation
induced events is addressed in the Safety
section of this document, 3.3.6
Requirement 2: Destructive Failures and
Non-destructive Latches due to
Radiation
The CDPS hardware shall exhibit no
destructive failures and non-destructive
latches when exposed to a minimum of
200 MeV (+/- 10 Mei) protons to a
fluence of 1E10 protons/cm2.
Rationale: Parts that are exposed to the
proton test environment and do not
demonstrate destructive failure modes
and non-destructive latches can be
expected to have an MTBF of 10 years
or greater if such a failure mode exists.
An example of a destructive failure mode
would be a destructive failure due to
high current or gate rupture.
NASA accepts the risk that some
destructive failures and non-destructive
latches may occur; however, this
probability is deemed small and the risk
acceptable. When it is assumed that
there are three operational strings of
CDPS hardware, the probability of
losing all three strings due to this failure
mode during a 10 day mission becomes
very small [theoretically (2x10-8]. Since
the 10 year or greater MTBF associated
with these unseen failure modes are of
the same order of magnitude as the
maintenance calculations and sparing
plans for this project, they can be
considered with the repair and recovery
from non-radiation induced hard
failures.
Definition of Functional Interrupt - an
ionizing radiation-induced error that
requires user intervention for recovery
but does not have a latch up or other
radiation-induced destructive failure
mode as the underlying cause.
The second of the two requirements, that
dealing with destructive failure modes,
arises from our experience which
indicates that it is undesirable to fly any
part that can easily be destroyed by a
proton event. There may be cases where
the part in question is necessary for the
mission and in that case the destructive
event must be mitigated such that the
system can survive the radiation hit and
have power recycled to regain
operational status. This was done
successfully in the early International
Space Station (ISS) program for a
system called the Early Communications
System or ECOM. In general however,
heroics such as this should be minimized
and that is why the required performance
is "latch free". The ECOM situation was
that the radiation testing had to be done
late in the program evolution and there
was no feasible way, financially or
schedule-wise, to redesign. Mitigation
was the only alternative.
The first requirement regarding the 1000
day MTBF for human intervention is
more interesting. Of course one of the
failure modes in hardware systems is
what we identify as a "functional
interrupt" (a concise definition was
presented earlier). To the outside
observer the functional interrupt presents
itself as a condition where the unit is not
longer responsive or operating.	 It
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appears to have ceased operating even
though it may be drawing no more than
the normal amount of power and in some
aspects looks as though it is functioning.
On the inside the unit has been forced
out of its normal operating cycle by a
non-destructive event like a bit flip
which caused the software to go off
program or some other change which
halted the normal flow. Recovery from
this condition will require human
intervention to either initiate a soft
reboot in software or to cycle power to
bring the unit back up. Functional
interrupts are common in hardware
systems using COTS products.
The decision to impose a 1000 day
MTBF for functional interrupts came
from the desire to minimize the need for
the astronaut crew to have to service the
CAU hardware to correct for the
interrupts. The choice of 1000 days was
based on what was thought to be an
acceptable `aggravation factor' to the
crew work schedule. Of course, testing
on the flight hardware design when it is
built may find that the 1000 days can't
be met. But at least there is an agreed to
starting point for the performance and
operability requirement.
4.0 Radiation Testing, Test Results and
Impacts. In 1995 NASA/JSC was
developing a new UHF radio for the
Shuttle and ISS crews plus trying to
utilize a commercial laptop computer on
orbit. The UHF radio became known as
the Space to Space Communication
System (SSCS) and the laptop, which
was the IBM 760XD Thinkpad, became
known as the Portable Computer System
(PCS). For the SSCS, the radiation
testing dilemma was that of not having
the budget to individually test with low
energy heavy ions the more than 100
different commercial parts in the design.
For the laptop the dilemma was that the
individual parts could not even be
identified as to part type. They were
generally IBM proprietary. So part
testing with low energy heavy ions was
not an option for PCS.
4.1 Radiation Testing with High Energyy
Protons. The only solution for the SSCS
and PCS dilemma was to test with a high
energy particle which allows testing at
the board or system level. The only high
energy particle readily available and
affordable is the proton. So high energy
proton testing was chosen as the only
test avenue that would reveal any data
regarding performance of the systems
once they were on orbit. The questions
that arose were what useful data was
gained from the proton test and what
was the remaining risk for that portion of
the radiation susceptibility that the
proton could not explore.
The next 3 years or so were spent trying
to model and understand the interaction
between a high energy proton and the
silicon host medium. Under the
Ieadership of Dr. Pat O'NeilI and the late
Dr. Gautam Badhwar, NASA/JSC has
developed and refined a test philosophy
using high energy protons to estimate
performance on orbit for both the proton
environment and the heavy ion
environment. Of equal importance, it
also quantifies the remaining risk for
failure modes not seen in the proton test.
This philosophy has been applied to
flight hardware for approximately six
years and there have been no surprises
from the electronic systems flying on
orbit.
The following is a synopsis of this test
philosophy:
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1. Test with 200 MeV protons to a
minimum fluence of 1e10 protons/cm2.
2. Use Bendel A for estimating proton
cross section for error rate in the flight
orbit.
3. Estimate the on orbit heavy ion error
rate contribution from the JSC model.
4. Combine the two rates to estimate the
overall error rate.
5. Obtain total dose pedigree during the
proton testing.
6. Perform heavy ion tests as needed to
define longer term MTBF's as needed.
Note: A 10 year or greater MTBF is
expected for failure modes not seen in
the proton testing.
For those interested in exploring this
further, the pertinent literature reference
here is:
"Internuclear Cascade - Evaporation
Model for LET Spectra of 200 MeV
Protons Used for Parts Testing", O'Neill
et al, IEEE Transactions on Nuclear
Science, Vol. 45, No. 6, December,
1998, pp. 2467 - 2474.
4.2 Test Results. Some fifty systems
have been tested using the proton test
approach over the last 6 years. These
systems tested range in size from small,
single board functional devices like a
1553 bus interface card to a total system
like an integrate Global Positioning
System/Inertial Navigation System
(GPS/INS). All of these systems were
tested at the top assembly level using
product level or application level test
software and approaches so that errors
like functional interrupts were seen as
close to the level of on orbit use as
possible. Conversion of test error rates
to expected on orbit error rates becomes
much more simple and straightforward.
In more than a few cases, catastrophic
failure modes were demonstrated to
exist. In every case the failure mode
was either designed out or mitigated to
an acceptable level of risk. The
important point is that, even for off the
shelf products, these failure modes were
found quickly and inexpensively.
The bottom line, and one which senior
management has come to appreciate, is
that essentially every system that flies
has an MTBF or probability of not
completing its mission without some
type of failure. This proton testing
quantifies these MTBF's and allows
project management to accept the risk or
take actions to reduce it.
4.3 Impacts. The impacts of testing with
high energy protons have been many:
Cost. A 20-20 hindsight case was taken
for the SSCS radio system in which a
cost comparison was made between
making a hypothetical heavy ion test at
the part level and the actual cost for the
proton test done at the box level. The
part level test could not test every part in
the box. It tested only some three dozen
of the parts felt to be most critical and
suspect. The proton test not only tested
every active part but also automatically
gave a total dose pedigree of 600
Rad(Si). The part level heavy ion test
cost roughly $1 M which included about
8 man-years of engineering/technician
time. The actual proton test cost less
than $50K including 0.25 man-years of
engineering/technician time. Both
estimates include travel and test facility
costs.
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Awareness. The results of the proton
testing has raised awareness that
ionizing radiation failure modes are
system level problems today. This
awareness has become sufficiently
dominant so that "rad testing" is
becoming a standard part of the
hardware	 "qual	 program"	 like
thermal/vacuum and vibration. It is
being addressed at JSC early in the
program evolution.
A Driver of System Architecture. The
probability of success equation given
earlier in the paper is a powerful tool.
Sometimes mighty efforts are made to
increase the MTBF of a system and
hence improve the probability of success
for a mission. There are times when this
is not appropriate or efficient. Radiation
test results, especially with modern
COTS products, are forcing the address
of this issue.
A simple example is that of a system
built with a 50K hour MTBF. If its use
is for a 10 day mission (i.e., the Orbiter),
the probability of success is 0.9952. If
for any reason that performance was felt
to be insufficient, one might try to
increase the product MTBF to 100K
hours. If after a lot of hard work that
MTBF augmentation effort were
successful, the probability of mission
success would increase from 0.9952 to
0.9976. A paltry return for what
probably was a mighty effort. The better
approach would have been to make a
redundant string for the 50K hour
system. The probability of returning
from the mission with at least one string
working is one minus the probability of
losing both strings. With two strings the
probability of success goes from 0.9952
to 0.99998.
In today's world of COTS products, it is
hard to find a radiation MTBF of 50K
hours (5.7 years) at the product level.
One should expect radiation failure rates
to be a driver in defining overall system
architecture.
A Test-Early-Test-Often Philosophy is
Needed. A very high quality COTS
product used both in civilian aviation
and military aviation was selected
recently as a candidate product to fill a
need in one of JSC's two main manned
space flight programs. There is a great
deal of data on this product and that data
indicated that the overall MTBF of the
product in its aviation environment was
on the order of 100K hours. This
MTBF, coupled with the fact that the
product would be used in a triply
redundant configuration, seemed much
more than adequate from the probability
of successfully completing the mission
with at least one string still operating.
An inexpensive proton test was made on
the product and the indicated MTBF
from the radiation threat was
approximately 168 hours! Even in the
triply redundant configuration and with a
mission duration of only 10 days, the
probability of successfully completing
the flight with at least one string still
functioning was only about 0.5. While
the project is struggling to overcome this
set back, at least the bad news was
uncovered early in the development
program.
5.0 Final Thoughts. Even though very
preliminary and incomplete, the latest
round of testing modern products has
seemed to have a trend toward less
tolerance of the products to ionizing
radiation. If true, this will make the job
of meeting mission success requirements
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.more difficult. And this will be
independent of the type of radiation test
done, e.g. proton or heavy ion. It will
also further sensitize the design and
system architecture to the radiation
susceptibility of the electronics. The
vigilance to uncover radiation cost
drivers must be increased and the
awareness of susceptibility addressed as
early as the voicing of the very top level
system requirements.
While all COTS products are not the
same, there are those that are excellent
from the standpoint of part selection,
design, and manufacture. The use of
such COTS in space is one of the
enabling features of today's technology.
The user, however, must address the
radiation issue and settle them. Without
COTS products, the manned space flight
program payback would be greatly
diminished.
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